pg. 185-229

9 Principles of War
-Objective
-Offensive
-Mass
-Economy of Force
-Maneuver
-Unity of Command
-Security
-Surprise
-Simplicity




Both forces, whether they were aware of it or not, utilized the 9 principles of war in Ia Drang. It is easy to sit back, years later, and disseminate what happened and how well they performed in respective principles, but things get immeasurably more complicated on the ground. Therefore, criticism must be given with that in mind.

When they were rescuing the Lost Platoon, the U.S. forces were going on the offensive. They advanced well into hostile territory, noted by the grenading and preparatory artillery strikes, and they reached their objective of reaching their stranded soldiers. However, it was the NVA who maintained the offensive the rest of the battle, predominantly because of their far superior mass.

The NVA used mass to their advantages, albeit under very heavy casualties. Waves of soldiers were advancing in straight lines, allowing them to be cut down, but their size, combined with a noteworthy ferocity with which they fought, made them a formidable enemy. Overall, though, the NVA did not were not able use mass and concentration of forces effectively, especially because of the artillery capabilities of the U.S.

The main power of the U.S. was concentration of mass, which was a byproduct of overall excellent communication. Artillery was designated where it was supposed to go, Hueys were buzzing in an out, and the companies were able to advance or set up security under unity of command.

Security along Diduryk's portion of X-ray was described in detail, and used as an example of how security should be. The MGs had proven their worth in the previous engagements, and were placed with interlocking fields of fire. The captain was aware that the NVA would probably be coming again, which negated their power of surprise. Thrown against an especially tight security, NVA forces would be prevented from bringing the full weight of their numbers to bear and quickly overrunning the position.

pgs. 128-155

The situation at LZ X-ray was undoubtedly bad. It seems like the then Lt. Col. Moore mentions that the 7th Cavalry was sustaining casualties almost every other line. The infantry on the ground were facing fierce resistance from a numerically superior enemy, and this was eroding their combat effectiveness in a noticeable manner.

From what one reads in the book, the Hueys were doing exactly what they needed to be doing. A substantial number of wounded were being succesfully evacuated with lifesaving effects, and apart from the Lost Platoon, ammunition and water sounded like they were being resupplied in a timely manner, which seems like a precious silver lining in the engagement. One medic reporting that he had a superflous amount of morphine seemed like a rarity on a battlefield that was generating so many wounded.

The communication of the American forces played an enormous role in fueling their engagement of the enemy. The rear HQ at Falcon was useful in coordinating supplies and evacuations into X-ray, although the situation with the Medvac choppers seems be screwy for lack of a better word. Keeping the choppers out at a time when they were needed the most is just plain bad practice, which meant that the Hueys now had to take over medical duties as well. The ability to radio in for artillery, and the fact that the artillery seemed to be well munitinoed with diverse fire capabilities such as flares and WP shells, came off as immensely helpful. The presence of artillery played a very heavy role in the battle, yet the enemy kept coming. If the capabilities of artillery fire had not been there, the situation would've been very different indeed.

Shows how important it is to coordinate the forces around the actual boots on the ground and enable them to succeed. The infantry are doing the actual fighting, but their effectiveness in enhanced a thousandfold by the Hueys and artillery batteries.