Pg 92-128

I took notice of Capt. Nadal's decision to withdraw during the rescue of the cut-off platoon. Although it was imperative to rescue the stranded men, he made the judgment that more lives would be saved by withdrawing from the situation. He used his NCOs to formulate a decision, and then made the call, undoubtedly a very hard decision to make.

Adaptation to one's circumstances was also displayed by Crandall when he utilized his own Huey to evacuate the casualties. Like in FLRC, making the best use of one's resources, even if they weren't intended for that specific use, can have a pretty significant impact.

Pages 52-91

Moore's decision to be one of the first boots on the ground is a double-edged blade. The decision struck me as the epitome of leading from the front.

The Lieutenant's violence of action was impressive and praiseworthy, but his decision to advance beyond his range was not. This shows how important it is to keep yourself in check when the tide seems to be in your favor. Rushing forward can not only lead to consquences for yourself and your platoon, but can affect many others whose duty it is to protect you. Not only was the lieutenant KIA, but men from his platoon died as well, as did others trying to extricate the stranded men from their situation.



This drove home the point that you cannot afford to throw caution aside by thinking that its only your life that you're risking. When you put your life at risk, you automatically endanger those whose duty it is to get you out of there. This situation reminded me of Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia of '93 (Black Hawk Down). The downing of the choppers did not just kill or endanger the pilots, but an entire battalion of men who hen had to go in there and get them out, dead or alive. Being careless with your life is not an option, since there are others who have to deal with the consequences even after you died.

That being said, I was impressed with the soldiers' understanding of the COC. As soon as Herrick was KIA, the chain of command was followed twice more in rapid succession.

Pages 1-52

Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore's respect for his former enemy is noteworthy. Although he is closely acquainted with the violence and hatred that are the natural by-products of kill-or-be-killed, he nevertheless acknowledged that they 'fought and died bravely' (xxv). This way of regarding men whom you killed while they were killing your soldiers is peculiar, but it somehow seems right. It is gallant and respectful, wresting a sense of honor from the unimaginable horror of war. It seems that the author has a healthy respect for the enemy, which in turn raises my regard for him. One of the biggest flaws that one can have, from the outside looking in, is a lack of respect for the enemy. It is much, much better to overestimate and win by a larger margin that to understimate and needlesly lose men.


Another point in the book that I took special notice of was General Kinnard's emphasis on decentralizing leadership. Pushing authority down to the man on the ground by having everyone know the mission and plan well enough to execute it in the absence of leaders is an invaluable tool.

The emphasis of how the NCO sargeants were the most important people in the battalion was not lost on me. I remember Capt. Ambrose talking about how important it is to meet with your sergeants and discuss goals and plans, and Hal did exactly that.



Lastly, the observation stemming back to the Civil War that a good officer should ride his horse as little as possible makes perfect sense. A commander who only operates from a high vantage point has the potential to misjudge the actual situation, which I feel was perfectly summed up by this quote on pg. 45: "...too easy to demand the impossible of your troops; too easy to make mistakes that are fatal only to those souls far below in the mud, the blood, and the confusion."

We Were Soldiers Once... And Young