The Sergeat and the Ghost/Escape and Evade

The battle at Albany was portrayed as a tumult of confusion, with men getting hit left and right. Probably the most disturbing instances mentioned were of men getting shoveled up into their ponchos after they'd been blown to pieces or of the sounds of American wounded being executed by the VC. Almost makes me want to become a pacifist.

Several times in the book, there are instances where the quoted words of individuals surprised me in registering these beyond-terrible acts to fellow human beings, but then continuing to function: "The enemy were killing our wounded. When the relief patrol came in it was from my south, I think." Many moments such as this shock me with the detachment through they regard these acts, yet they keep going. I'm starting to get the picture that there is nothing else to do but to keep going. Your duty is always the same. To disregard a portion of your humanity is the Faustian pact for military competence.

Luck was also a notable presence on the battlefield. Braveboy's story of survival after several days, or Sergeant's Kluge's men not getting shot up while they were carrying wounded with their rifles on their backs were undeniably lucky. No matter how good or bad a soldier you are, blind luck will have a good say in what happens. So, in that case, there is no need to worry about what you can't control. The last thing I want, however, is for something bad to happen that I could have controlled but wasn't competent enough to do it.

Hell in a Very Small Place...Death in the Tall Grass

Confusion is always the bane of all fighting forces. Disorganization and panic fragments and disperses a unit's fighting effectiveness substantially, and men are much more likely to die needlessly as a result.

Every plan looks nice and simple on paper, but out on the actual battlefield things are bound to become much more convoluted and complicated. Factors such as terrain and temperature have massive impacts that are easy to forget about if doing planning in an air-conditioned room talking about formations. This became apparent on the FTXs, where even though the mission was cut-and-dry and centered in a small area, confusion nevertheless took place. People became lost as a result of blind travel, and sometimes the objective itself would be completely bypassed. These situations slowed down operations significantly and slowed momentum down. And this was only on a mock training mission...

The sister battalion's experience at Albany also showed that American forces are by no means indestructible or untouchable. It is vital to understand that there is no built-in superiority that makes us invulnerable and victorious, and that the enemy is very capable of destroying you if you let him.

pg. 185-229

9 Principles of War
-Objective
-Offensive
-Mass
-Economy of Force
-Maneuver
-Unity of Command
-Security
-Surprise
-Simplicity




Both forces, whether they were aware of it or not, utilized the 9 principles of war in Ia Drang. It is easy to sit back, years later, and disseminate what happened and how well they performed in respective principles, but things get immeasurably more complicated on the ground. Therefore, criticism must be given with that in mind.

When they were rescuing the Lost Platoon, the U.S. forces were going on the offensive. They advanced well into hostile territory, noted by the grenading and preparatory artillery strikes, and they reached their objective of reaching their stranded soldiers. However, it was the NVA who maintained the offensive the rest of the battle, predominantly because of their far superior mass.

The NVA used mass to their advantages, albeit under very heavy casualties. Waves of soldiers were advancing in straight lines, allowing them to be cut down, but their size, combined with a noteworthy ferocity with which they fought, made them a formidable enemy. Overall, though, the NVA did not were not able use mass and concentration of forces effectively, especially because of the artillery capabilities of the U.S.

The main power of the U.S. was concentration of mass, which was a byproduct of overall excellent communication. Artillery was designated where it was supposed to go, Hueys were buzzing in an out, and the companies were able to advance or set up security under unity of command.

Security along Diduryk's portion of X-ray was described in detail, and used as an example of how security should be. The MGs had proven their worth in the previous engagements, and were placed with interlocking fields of fire. The captain was aware that the NVA would probably be coming again, which negated their power of surprise. Thrown against an especially tight security, NVA forces would be prevented from bringing the full weight of their numbers to bear and quickly overrunning the position.

pgs. 128-155

The situation at LZ X-ray was undoubtedly bad. It seems like the then Lt. Col. Moore mentions that the 7th Cavalry was sustaining casualties almost every other line. The infantry on the ground were facing fierce resistance from a numerically superior enemy, and this was eroding their combat effectiveness in a noticeable manner.

From what one reads in the book, the Hueys were doing exactly what they needed to be doing. A substantial number of wounded were being succesfully evacuated with lifesaving effects, and apart from the Lost Platoon, ammunition and water sounded like they were being resupplied in a timely manner, which seems like a precious silver lining in the engagement. One medic reporting that he had a superflous amount of morphine seemed like a rarity on a battlefield that was generating so many wounded.

The communication of the American forces played an enormous role in fueling their engagement of the enemy. The rear HQ at Falcon was useful in coordinating supplies and evacuations into X-ray, although the situation with the Medvac choppers seems be screwy for lack of a better word. Keeping the choppers out at a time when they were needed the most is just plain bad practice, which meant that the Hueys now had to take over medical duties as well. The ability to radio in for artillery, and the fact that the artillery seemed to be well munitinoed with diverse fire capabilities such as flares and WP shells, came off as immensely helpful. The presence of artillery played a very heavy role in the battle, yet the enemy kept coming. If the capabilities of artillery fire had not been there, the situation would've been very different indeed.

Shows how important it is to coordinate the forces around the actual boots on the ground and enable them to succeed. The infantry are doing the actual fighting, but their effectiveness in enhanced a thousandfold by the Hueys and artillery batteries.

Pg 92-128

I took notice of Capt. Nadal's decision to withdraw during the rescue of the cut-off platoon. Although it was imperative to rescue the stranded men, he made the judgment that more lives would be saved by withdrawing from the situation. He used his NCOs to formulate a decision, and then made the call, undoubtedly a very hard decision to make.

Adaptation to one's circumstances was also displayed by Crandall when he utilized his own Huey to evacuate the casualties. Like in FLRC, making the best use of one's resources, even if they weren't intended for that specific use, can have a pretty significant impact.

Pages 52-91

Moore's decision to be one of the first boots on the ground is a double-edged blade. The decision struck me as the epitome of leading from the front.

The Lieutenant's violence of action was impressive and praiseworthy, but his decision to advance beyond his range was not. This shows how important it is to keep yourself in check when the tide seems to be in your favor. Rushing forward can not only lead to consquences for yourself and your platoon, but can affect many others whose duty it is to protect you. Not only was the lieutenant KIA, but men from his platoon died as well, as did others trying to extricate the stranded men from their situation.



This drove home the point that you cannot afford to throw caution aside by thinking that its only your life that you're risking. When you put your life at risk, you automatically endanger those whose duty it is to get you out of there. This situation reminded me of Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia of '93 (Black Hawk Down). The downing of the choppers did not just kill or endanger the pilots, but an entire battalion of men who hen had to go in there and get them out, dead or alive. Being careless with your life is not an option, since there are others who have to deal with the consequences even after you died.

That being said, I was impressed with the soldiers' understanding of the COC. As soon as Herrick was KIA, the chain of command was followed twice more in rapid succession.

Pages 1-52

Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore's respect for his former enemy is noteworthy. Although he is closely acquainted with the violence and hatred that are the natural by-products of kill-or-be-killed, he nevertheless acknowledged that they 'fought and died bravely' (xxv). This way of regarding men whom you killed while they were killing your soldiers is peculiar, but it somehow seems right. It is gallant and respectful, wresting a sense of honor from the unimaginable horror of war. It seems that the author has a healthy respect for the enemy, which in turn raises my regard for him. One of the biggest flaws that one can have, from the outside looking in, is a lack of respect for the enemy. It is much, much better to overestimate and win by a larger margin that to understimate and needlesly lose men.


Another point in the book that I took special notice of was General Kinnard's emphasis on decentralizing leadership. Pushing authority down to the man on the ground by having everyone know the mission and plan well enough to execute it in the absence of leaders is an invaluable tool.

The emphasis of how the NCO sargeants were the most important people in the battalion was not lost on me. I remember Capt. Ambrose talking about how important it is to meet with your sergeants and discuss goals and plans, and Hal did exactly that.



Lastly, the observation stemming back to the Civil War that a good officer should ride his horse as little as possible makes perfect sense. A commander who only operates from a high vantage point has the potential to misjudge the actual situation, which I feel was perfectly summed up by this quote on pg. 45: "...too easy to demand the impossible of your troops; too easy to make mistakes that are fatal only to those souls far below in the mud, the blood, and the confusion."

We Were Soldiers Once... And Young